

**The Impact of MOOTW-based Unit Training on Leader  
Development**

**A Monograph  
by  
Major Joseph F. Birchmeier  
Corps of Engineers**

**School of Advanced Military Studies  
United States Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**First Term AY 99-00**

**Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited**

**DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4**

**20000919 105**

**SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES**

**MONOGRAPH APPROVAL**

Major Joseph F. Birchmeier

Title of Monograph: The Impact of MOOTW-based Unit Training on Leader  
Development

Approved by:

Monograph Director

\_\_\_\_\_  
COL Richard G. Kaiura, MSME

Director, School of Advanced  
Military Studies

\_\_\_\_\_  
COL Robin P. Swan, MA, MMAS

Director, Graduate Degree  
Program

\_\_\_\_\_  
Philip J. Brooks, Ph.D.

Accepted this 6<sup>th</sup> Day of December 1999

## ABSTRACT

### THE IMPACT OF MOOTW-BASED UNIT TRAINING ON LEADER DEVELOPMENT by MAJ Joseph F. Birchmeier, USA, 49 pages

The end of the Cold War has dramatically changed the strategic environment within which the United States Army must operate. The threat of an attack by the Soviet Union into Western Europe no longer exists. The change in strategic environment has resulted in a change in the force structure of the United States Army. The Army has reduced its size by almost 40% in the last ten years, and whereas the Army used to rely on forward deployed forces to deter an attack by the Soviet Union, the Army now relies on force projection of forces from the United States to a crisis area. In addition to the change in force structure, the end of the Cold War has brought about a change in the types of operations that the Army are most likely to participate in. In the past, the Army primarily concerned itself with preparing for operations such as JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM. Increasingly however, the Army in recent years, had to primarily respond to stability operations in places such as Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo.

The issue that now confronts the Army is how to train its forces to be able to rapidly respond to the wide spectrum of potential operations. In response to this problem, the Army is reviewing its strategy for unit training based on a unit mission essential task list (METL) focused on warfighting tasks. One proposal is that in order to be ready, relevant, and responsive, the Army should consider changing to a unit-level training program that is focused on military operations other than war (MOOTW) tasks rather than warfighting tasks.

This monograph looks at the impact that a shift from a warfighting-based METL to a MOOTW-based METL would have on the development of a company grade, combat arms officer. In order to evaluate this impact, this monograph first reviews the goals of the officer development process and focus on one pillar of the officer development process – operational assignments. Next, this monograph determines the skills required of a company grade officer and compares these skills against the skills developed if the officer trained in a unit using a warfighting-based METL and compares these skills against those he would develop in a unit using a MOOTW-based METL. This monograph then compares the two strategies using the criteria of responsiveness, preparedness for future assignment and readiness.

This monograph concludes that a shift in training strategy would not negatively impact on the company grade, combat arms officer. The officer training in a unit using a warfighting-based METL develops his tactical and technical skills to a greater degree than the officer training in a unit using a MOOTW-based METL. However, the officer training in a unit using a MOOTW-based METL develops his conceptual and interpersonal skills to a greater degree. These advantages in training in units using a MOOTW-based METL demonstrate that a shift in strategy would not negatively impact on the company grade, combat arms officer.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
I. Introduction.....	1
II. Officer Development.....	6
III. Skills Required of a Company Grade Officer.....	8
Interpersonal Skill.....	9
Conceptual Skill.....	11
Technical Skill.....	16
Tactical Skill.....	17
IV. Field Grade Skills.....	18
V. Company Grade Skills Versus Warfighting-based METL.....	21
VI. Company Grade Skills Versus MOOTW-based METL.....	27
VII. Comparison of Skills Developed in the Company Grade Officer.....	32
VIII. Deployment Timelines.....	33
IX. Analysis.....	35
Responsiveness.....	35
Preparedness for Future Assignment.....	36
Ready.....	37
X. Conclusions .....	38
Endnotes.....	41
Bibliography.....	45

## INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War has brought about a new strategic environment. Prior to the end of the Cold War, containment of the Soviet Union and the defense of Western Europe were the primary security challenges for the United States.<sup>1</sup> In order to meet this security challenge, the United States Army maintained a large, stable personnel end strength; personnel strength at the end of the Cold War was 769,741.<sup>2</sup> During the Cold War, the Army developed a strategy of deterrence and relied heavily on forward deployed units within Germany to enable it to respond rapidly to any crisis situation in Europe.

This new strategic environment has prompted the United States to revise its National Security Strategy and its accompanying National Military Strategy. The Army, for example, no longer fears attack from the Soviet Union; a numerically superior enemy with equipment of similar capabilities. In response to the reduced risk of confrontation with the Soviet Union, the Army's personnel strength has been reduced to below 500,000.<sup>3</sup> The loss of a monolithic threat has also spawned a number of regional threats, which the Army must now be prepared to address. This demands a greater need for flexibility and rapid response capabilities. The Army now relies on its ability to rapidly project power from the United States in order to meet its security needs.

The United States Army is currently experimenting with the digitization of its forces in an attempt to maintain its lethality as it continues to get smaller. In theory, digitization will allow the Army to achieve battlefield situational awareness superiority over any and all future enemies. This situational awareness will enable units to disperse on the battlefield while massing the effects of their weapons systems on the enemy at a time and location of the Army's choosing. "Recent military-technical developments point toward an increase in the depth, breadth, and height of the battlefield. This

extension of the battle space with fewer soldiers in it is an evolutionary trend in the conduct of war.”<sup>4</sup> The Army’s increased reliance on digitization to assist in the command and control of its forces has created new leadership challenges for the company grade officer.

The United States’ security concerns center on maintaining stability around the world and providing a secure environment for humanitarian assistance, when needed. The United States’ current National Security Strategy states, “Our citizens have a direct stake in the prosperity and stability of other nations, in their support for international norms and human rights, in their ability to combat international crime, in their open markets, and in their efforts to protect the environment.”<sup>5</sup> The increasing importance of the Army to be able to conduct a wide spectrum of military actions from stability or support operations to offensive and defensive operations is shown in the Army Vision statement recently published by the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric Shinseki and the Secretary of the Army, the Honorable Louis Caldera. They state that American soldiers allow the United States to meet its security objectives by “finding peaceful solutions to the frictions between nation states, addressing the problems of human suffering, and when required, fighting and winning our Nations wars.”<sup>6</sup> This vision statement goes on to specify that there is “a need for land forces for a variety of missions extending from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to peacekeeping and peacemaking to major theater of wars.”<sup>7</sup>

The issue that the Army now must confront in meeting the demands placed on it by this new strategic environment is how to best train its personnel to rapidly respond to the broad spectrum of potential operations given its limited personnel strength and its

reliance on power projection. The Army is reviewing its strategy for unit training based on a unit mission essential task list (METL) focused on training warfighting tasks. Currently, Army units focus training on warfighting tasks and use Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MREs), prior to deployment, to prepare for stability and support operations (SASO). One proposal is that in order to be ready, relevant, and responsive, the Army should consider changing to a unit-level training program that is focused on military operations other than war (MOOTW) tasks rather than warfighting tasks. In this concept, units would focus METLs on MOOTW tasks and "core" tasks that are applicable to all types of operations.<sup>8</sup> This concept has merit due to the fact that since the end of Operation DESERT STORM, the United States Army has not participated in any military actions primarily focused on offensive or defensive operations. During the same time period, however, the Army has participated in numerous military actions requiring stability and support operations.

The fact that different tasks are trained in preparation for MOOTW than in preparation for a major theater war (MTW) scenario is clear. As the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division prepared for operations in Haiti, it developed three types of tasks that needed to be trained: "Collective tasks that are unique to peace operations, tasks that are normal wartime tasks that must be preformed under significantly different conditions, and leader and staff tasks that are unique to peace operations."<sup>9</sup> The Marine Corps' Lessons Learned Summary of Operation Joint Endeavor states "warfighting and peace operations require different skills and capabilities."<sup>10</sup> This monograph demonstrates that shifting from a warfighting-based METL to a MOOTW-based METL would not have a negative impact on the development of a combat arms, company grade officer.

The Army has expended a significant amount of time and effort on the subject of the challenges facing the military officer in the coming years. This monograph leverages numerous articles written on this subject by both military officers and civilian experts. Additionally, this monograph examines articles and after action reviews written by individuals and units that have participated in stability and support operations as well as offensive and defensive operations. This monograph determines whether a shift from a warfighting-based METL to a MOOTW-based METL would negatively impact on the development of combat arms, company grade officers.

In order to answer the research question, this monograph first discusses the current Army officer development process. This monograph then focuses on one pillar of the officer development process – operational assignments. It discusses how operational assignments contribute to the overall development of company grade officers.

Next, this monograph discusses the skills that company grade officers should develop. This discussion examines the tactical, technical, conceptual and interpersonal skills that company grade, combat arms officers require. Based on the skills that a company grade officer should develop, this monograph discusses how a shift in focus from a warfighting-based METL to a MOOTW-based METL will impact on the skills developed by company grade officers.

This monograph's analysis discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the different skills that an officer may develop if the Army changes its current strategy for unit training. It also discusses the impact that a shift in strategy would have on the officer as he assumes field-grade responsibilities. Finally, it determines if the different skills developed by the officer better prepare him for the wide range of operations he could face



in a relatively short period of time. Criteria used to evaluate the impact that a change in unit training strategy will have are defined as:

1. **Responsiveness:** Historically, the time that units have been given, from alert to deployment. For offensive and defensive operations, Operation Desert Storm and Operation Just Cause are examined. Operations in Bosnia and Kosovo are examined for MOOTW operations. The premise on which these examinations are based is that the less time units can expect to have prior to deployment, the more important it is for unit officers to train on the skills necessary to meet those contingencies during METL training.
2. **Preparedness for Future Assignments.** The skills that a field-grade combat officer needs will be compared against those skills he would develop using either a warfighting-based approach or a MOOTW-based approach. The approach that better prepares an officer for field-grade assignments would be preferred.
3. **Ready.** The monograph examines which approach better prepares an officer for a wide spectrum of operations. Included in this criterion will be an examination of the complexity of the skills developed and the mental flexibility that these skills provide the officer. The strategy that develops greater conceptual skill in the officer would be preferred.

This monograph shows that the first two criteria are based on the goals of the officer development process. The last criterion is based on the need of company grade

officer to be relevant. In order to be relevant, he must be able to rapidly shift from one type of operation to another. Only highly developed conceptual skills can allow the officer to do this. In order for a shift in training strategy to be considered to have a negative impact on the officer development program for combat arms, company grade officers, all three criteria must favor the warfighting-based METL.

This monograph makes one assumption. This assumption is that, in shifting from a warfighting-based METL to a MOOTW-based METL, the Army's leadership has considered the risks associated with this decision in terms of unit readiness to conduct offensive and defensive operations. This assumption is necessary so that the monograph can focus only on the issue of leader development without broadening the monograph to a discussion of the impact on unit readiness and risk to national security.

#### **OFFICER DEVELOPMENT**

Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-58, "Leader Development for America's Army: The Enduring Legacy," Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, "Commissioned Officer and Career Management," and Field Manual 22-100, "Army Leadership," all provide pertinent information concerning the Army's current strategy to develop combat arms, company grade officers. The paragraphs that follow will summarize the information provided in these publications.

The officer development process consists of three pillars: institutional training, operational assignments and self-development.<sup>11</sup> Institutional learning is conducted in formal military and civilian schools. In these schools, the officer is "trained to perform critical tasks while learning the values, attributes, skills and actions essential to high-quality leadership."<sup>12</sup> The institutional training provided to the officer normally prepares

him for an operational assignment that immediately follows the successful completion of a course of instruction. An operational assignment “provides them [the officer] the opportunity to use, hone and build on what they learned through the formal education process.”<sup>13</sup> The final pillar of the officer development process, self-development “is a planned, progressive and sequential program followed by leaders to enhance and sustain their military competencies.”<sup>14</sup> Self-development should consist of “individual study, research, professional reading, practice and self-assessment.”<sup>15</sup>

This monograph examines the impact that a change from a warfighting-based METL to a MOOTW-based METL will have on only one of these pillars, the operational assignment. Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-58 states that operational assignments allow the officer to “gain the experience needed for more complex and higher-level assignments.”<sup>16</sup> The pamphlet goes on to say that one of the primary objectives of the operational assignment is:

METL-based leader training to enhance and sustain SKBs [skills, knowledge and beliefs] gained during institutional training and education and prepare leaders for operational missions. By using the METL as a framework or basis, leaders can concentrate on honing those SKBs that support the unit mission.<sup>17</sup>

Thus, operational assignments are specifically meant to do two things for the officer. First, operational assignments prepare the officer for follow-on assignments both at his current and next higher rank. Within the scope of this monograph, this means that operational assignments should prepare lieutenants to be company commanders and battalion staff officers and should begin to prepare captains to operate at the field grade level. The second thing that operational assignments do is to prepare the officer to assist the unit in accomplishing its mission. The concept is that while the unit is conducting

METL training, the officer will develop the required skills to support the unit in accomplishing those tasks. These two goals, preparation for follow-on assignments and the readiness of the officer to assist the unit to accomplish its mission, across the entire spectrum of potential operations, will be used as two of the criteria to evaluate the impact that a switch to a MOOTW-based METL would have on combat arms company grade officers.

#### **SKILLS REQUIRED OF A COMPANY GRADE OFFICER**

In order to discuss the impact that a shift from a METL focused on warfighting tasks to a METL focused on MOOTW tasks will have on a combat arms, company grade officer, a baseline must be established. This baseline must include all of the skills that a combat arms, company grade officer should possess regardless of the operation he is expected to accomplish. This baseline, in effect, is the "theoretical officer" on which this monograph bases the rest of its argument.

The Army places company grade officers into what it calls the direct level of leadership. "Direct leadership is face-to-face, front line leadership...leaders at this level develop their subordinates directly, one-on-one; they also influence the organization through their subordinates."<sup>18</sup> Field Manual 22-100, "Army Leadership", develops four categories of skills that a direct leader should possess: interpersonal, conceptual, technical and tactical.<sup>19</sup> This monograph uses this framework to discuss the skills that a company grade, combat officer should possess.

## **INTERPERSONAL SKILL**

FM 22-100 defines interpersonal skill as those needed to “know our people and how to work with them.”<sup>20</sup> However, this definition is not complete for a company grade officer. As will be shown, an officer must not only be able to understand and work with people that he has control of, but also must know how to work with, and in all probability influence, people outside of his organization. The possibility of an officer dealing directly with people outside of his organization has increased for several reasons.

First, the United States normally conducts multinational operations for both military and political reasons. Militarily, the diminishing size of the United States Army limits the forces it can deploy to a crisis region. Thus, as in the example of Operation DESERT STORM, the forces of numerous other countries were needed to create the combat ratios needed for successful operations. Politically, the United States will normally seek the approval and participation of countries within the crisis region, as well as other key allies. This provides legitimacy for the operation. Operations in Bosnia provide an excellent example. As of the end of September 1999, every NATO country with armed forces, as well as sixteen non-NATO countries, had provided forces to the stabilization forces operating in Bosnia.<sup>21</sup>

Second, the increased interest and experimentation by the military on digitization, as well as a shrinking force structure has produced an increased reliance by the Army on contractors to provide services to maintain the Army’s equipment. “The increased civilian presence will result from growing reliance on Department of Defense (DOD) civilian employees and contractors to perform combat support and combat service support (CS and CSS) functions.”<sup>22</sup> In some circumstances, contractors will live with the units in order to provide responsive support. The result is that leaders must influence the

actions of personnel to whom they are reliant upon to complete missions, but whom they do not directly control.

Finally, foreign soldiers and contractors are not the only outside people and organizations that a company grade officer must be able to interact with. "Armed forces have to operate...with local, regional and national governments, non-government organizations (NGOs), voluntary organizations, and humanitarian and relief agencies."<sup>23</sup>

The military officer must also interact with the media and the people who live within the area of operations. The officer may not necessarily "influence" these people, but he must be able to successfully "interact" with them.

The "CNN effect" has been well documented and is a reality that the military officer must be ready for. In fact, communications technology has increased to the point that it makes "each citizen with a video camera, a computer, and an internet link a potential reporter."<sup>24</sup> An officer must understand the importance of getting the right message out through the media when the opportunity arises as well as the implications his message can have.

The United States Army normally will not conduct operations within its own borders, except for support operations to provide disaster relief. For this reason, a company grade officer must be able to interact with the people living within the area of operations. Interaction may range from the need to purchase supplies or services from native people to mediating disputes between two parties. Boas Shamir and Eyal Ben-Ari states that "at present, military leaders are unprepared for the communication, mediation, conflict resolution and persuasion needed for performing civilian tasks and operating within interorganizational frameworks."<sup>25</sup>

So far, this monograph has discussed the interpersonal skills needed to successfully influence and interact with people and organizations outside the direct control of the officer. However, interpersonal skills are also needed to direct the actions of his subordinates. The officer must be able to: effectively communicate his orders and intent; build an effective team that will continue to function in times of severe hardship and stress; supervise his subordinates to ensure that his orders are being carried out; and understand how to effectively counsel his subordinates in order to maximize their development.<sup>26</sup>

In summary, the interpersonal skill for a military officer has three components; the ability to *influence*, *interact* and *direct*. He must be able to *influence* people and organizations not under his control, but necessary for mission accomplishment, specifically foreign soldiers, contractors, non-government organizations and relief agencies. He must be able to *interact* with people outside of his organization he will, in all probability encounter during operations, specifically the media and people who live in the area of operation. Additionally, he must be able to *direct* the actions of his subordinates through communication, team building, supervision and counseling.

#### **CONCEPTUAL SKILL**

Field Manual 22-100 defines conceptual skill as “skill with the ideas and thinking required in our job.”<sup>27</sup> In this monograph, conceptual skill is further divided into two components: critical reasoning and creative thinking.

Critical reasoning allows an officer to “get past the surface of the problem and think about it in depth.”<sup>28</sup> This is important for several reasons. First, as described earlier, the officer will be required to interact with the media when conducting

operations. Interpersonal skills are required to accurately and competently present ideas to the media. Conceptual skills are required to understand the depth of the problem being discussed and to understand its underlying cause and effect relationships. The ability of the media to rapidly transmit information around the world often places the company grade officer in the position to affect the strategic level of war by what he says and does. To prevent an officer from inadvertently having a negative impact, each must use critical reasoning to understand how his operation fits into the "big picture".

Second, it was shown that the company grade officer will interact with people living or transiting the area of operations and that the officer may have to negotiate or mediate with these people at times. To successfully negotiate or mediate, the officer will have to use critical reasoning. Peter Senge in his book, *The Fifth Discipline*, discusses the concept of systems thinking; an important tool in critical reasoning. He states that there is a need to look at a problem in its entirety in order to understand the impact that a given solution to the problem may have in terms of second or third order impacts.<sup>29</sup> An officer needs to have this skill both in their day-to-day dealings with their subordinates and when conducting negotiations or mediation. In order to be successful, the officer must, among other things, understand the culture of the people, their traditions, their aims or objectives, and recent conflicts within the region in order to get to the real issues behind a conflict.

Finally, as discussed earlier, the Army is increasing its reliance on digital systems to facilitate its command and control. This has led to an increased level of information available to the officer in order to make decisions. Officers must use critical reasoning to



make appropriate use of this information. Francis Fabian and D. T. Ogilvie discuss three issues that officers must keep in mind when attempting to process this information.

First, "that not all of the information *should* be processed to make the best decision."<sup>30</sup> This implies that there will be a greater need for officers to understand what information they are looking for from the routine reports available and relay this to their subordinates. Thus, much like commanders do when they establish priority intelligence requirements (PIR), to assist in making decisions on the battlefield, the officer will have to filter information on a routine basis because of the mountain of information available through digitized command and control systems.

Second, Fabian and Ogilvie state that the officer must understand the importance of the filters he places on the information he is receiving. They state, "Decision-makers explicitly accept the fact that their action is highly contingent on what information they select to act upon."<sup>31</sup> This is really a "catch-22" for the officer. He will be confronted with a command and control system that can provide him with the information he needs. However, this information may be contained within larger sets of data and impossible to discern because of the quantity of information available to him. To prevent this from happening, the officer must establish "PIR" for the information he requires. However, if these "PIR" are incorrect, he risks making bad decisions because he did not get the information he truly needed. Critical reasoning can minimize this risk by attempting to understand the true nature of the problem that is being solved. The better the understanding of the problem, the better the officer can structure his "PIR".

Finally, Fabian and Ogilvie argue that officers must understand that more information is not necessarily better. "The military is the ultimate example of a high

reliability organization that must seek information to make expected outcome more certain...[this] assumes that uncertainty *can* be reduced and risks lowered.”<sup>32</sup> What Fabian and Ogilvie seem to imply is that officers cannot become enamored with the quantity of information available. They must understand that there is a point of diminishing return; where more information will not significantly make a decision easier or better. Fabian and Ogilvie also point out that “knowledge ensues from action.”<sup>33</sup> In other words, sometimes officers must make a decision and take action in order to make additional pertinent information available.

Creative thinking is applied when an officer is confronted with a “problem he has not seen before or an old problem requires a new solution.”<sup>34</sup> The need for an officer to have this ability is obvious because a “military commander may find his or her unit involved in very different tasks under very different situations within short periods of time.”<sup>35</sup>

The increased use of digital command and control systems will place a greater demand on officers to be creative in the way they think, especially at the company grade level.

The military organization of the future is likely to be much more “organic” in nature. Organic organizations are characterized by a more flexible division of labor, decentralization of decision-making, low reliance on formal authority and hierarchy and on rules and regulations to coordinate work, and greater reliance on non-restricted, two-way, informal communication and coordination systems.<sup>36</sup>

The above comment has two impacts on the company grade officer that demand that he be capable of creative thinking. First is the decentralization of decision-making. Digital command and control systems allow for units to disperse to a much greater degree than at any other time in military history. The implications of this for the junior officer

are obvious. He will be relied on more and more to operate independently. This does not mean to say that he will not be able to communicate with his commander, but it implies that more and more he will be the decision-maker on the scene. Thus, he will, in all probability, be confronted with many situations that he has not been specifically trained for or experienced in his short time in the military. For this reason, his ability to devise solutions to unexpected or unfamiliar problems will be a necessity.

The second impact is the expected low reliance on rules and regulations to coordinate work. This implies that a military officer is expected to experience many situations that are not necessarily discussed in the doctrine or training he has received. To operate in an environment such as this, the officer must be able to develop feasible courses of action, despite the lack of doctrine, to operate in that specific environment.

In summary, the conceptual skill needed by a military officer can be broken into two components: critical reasoning and creative thinking. Critical reasoning is needed to understand the problem confronting the officer. It is needed in order for the officer to explain the part his unit is playing to solve the problem to either his subordinates or to the media. Additionally, critical reasoning is necessary to cipher through large amounts of available information, understand which pieces of information are important and use this information to make a timely decision. Creative thinking is essential to an officer because of the increased frequency of decisions being made at lower levels coupled with the fact that military officers are increasingly expected to operate in numerous different environments in a short time, and in situations lacking specific doctrine.

## TECHNICAL SKILL

Technical skill is the “knowledge [of] how to use our equipment.”<sup>37</sup> On the surface, the attainment of technical skill would appear to be a very simple task for the junior officer to achieve. In reality, this is a very complex task. First, the officer must possess complete knowledge of his organic equipment. He must understand such things as the range of each assigned weapon system, how fast his personnel and equipment can move about the battlefield, and how weather affects the operation of his equipment.

For the combat arms officer, mastery of his own organic equipment is not enough. In many situations, he will act as a company team commander and be augmented by tanks, infantry, engineers, or air defense artillery, and be expected to integrate these assets into his plan. “The company team is normally task organized by the battalion task force commander...to perform a variety of tactical missions as part of task force operations. In filling this combat role, the company team integrates with combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) elements.”<sup>38</sup> In order to do this effectively, he must understand the capabilities and limitations of the equipment task organized to him as well as he understands his own equipment.

A company grade officer is also impacted by the digital command and control systems that are a part of many combat vehicles. This digital command and control system can provide the officer with a great deal of information, but the officer must understand this capability in order to exploit its potential. Furthermore, he must understand how to get his equipment repaired if it becomes non-mission capable. Again, this is complicated by the digital command and control system within the vehicles. In most instances, the vehicle can be repaired through normal maintenance channels, but the digital systems will probably need the assistance of contractors to be repaired.

In summary, a company grade, combat arms officer must possess technical skill. Components of this skill include knowing his own equipment's capabilities; understanding the capabilities of the equipment organic to the units attached to him; and understanding how to use the digital command and control systems to maximize the employment of his weapons systems in order to accomplish his assigned missions.

#### **TACTICAL SKILL**

Field Manual 22-100 defines tactical skill as "putting together all the other skills, technical, conceptual, and interpersonal, to get the job done in war," and goes on to say that "tactical skill involves solving battlefield problems – which are usually rapid and dynamic in nature, regardless of whether the unit is in contact with the enemy or not."<sup>39</sup> Tactical skill in many ways parallel technical skills. Just as a combat arms, company grade officer must understand his own equipment and the equipment that can be tasked organized to his unit, he must be able to not only efficiently employ his own unit, but also be able to tactically employ any task organized units as well.

Thus, for the company grade, combat arms officer there are two components of tactical skill that must be considered, tactical employment of his organic units, and tactical employment of units task organized to his unit.

Figure 1 summarizes the skills required of a company grade, combat arms officer. Listed below each skill are the components of each of those skills. Any subcomponents of each skill are in parenthesis next to each component.

Interpersonal Skill
Influencing (foreign soldiers, contractors, NGOs)
Interacting (media and people living and transiting the AO)
Directing (subordinates)
Conceptual Skill
Critical Reasoning (understand depth of problem, mediate/negotiate, information management)
Creative Thinking (dispersed operations, availability of doctrine)
Technical Skill
Knowing Own Equipment
Knowing Attached Equipment
Maximizing Use of Digital C2 Systems
Tactical Skill
Employment of Own Unit
Integrate Attached Unit(s)

Figure 1. Skills Requirements of a Combat Arms, Company Grade Officer

## FIELD GRADE SKILLS

As an officer continues his career in the Army, he is continually placed in positions of greater authority and responsibility. It was mentioned earlier that one of the goals of officer development is to prepare officers for these new positions. In order to adequately analyze the impact that a shift from a warfighting-based METL to a MOOTW-based METL will have, we must consider which skills, that a company grade officer may develop, will most help him in his assignments as a field grade officer.

In the Army, a field grade officer is considered to have changed from a direct leader to an organizational leader. "Organizational leadership differs from direct leadership in that leaders work primarily through staffs and subordinates to accomplish the mission."<sup>40</sup> The Army considers operational assignments to be progressive; the skills developed as a company grade officer should assist the officer as he assumes duties as a field grade officer. "During operational assignments, leaders gain the experience needed for more complex and higher-level assignments."<sup>41</sup> However, it is noted that all skills developed as a company grade officer are not equally important to the field grade officer.

This section will describe those skills most critical for the officer as he transitions to organizational leadership.<sup>42</sup>

In its discussion of organizational leaders, Field Manual 22-100 states that “well-developed skills of persuasion and an openness to working through controversy in a positive way helps organizational leaders overcome resistance and build support.”<sup>43</sup> The manual goes on to state that “organizational leaders...resolve conflicts among subordinate commanders as well as any conflicts between their own organization and others.”<sup>44</sup> These statements reflect the fact that field grade officers exert less and less influence in their organizations through direct skills but more through influencing the actions of others. Relating this to the skills discussed earlier for the company grade officer, this indicates that of the components of interpersonal skill discussed earlier, the ability to influence others will most assist the officer in his assignments as a field grade officer.

Field Manual 22-100 also discusses the conceptual skills that an organizational leader needs to assist his unit accomplish its mission. The manual states that

Organizational leaders deal with a tremendous amount of information. Some information will make sense only to someone with a broad perspective and an understanding of the entire situation. Leaders communicate clearly to their staffs what information they need and then hold the staff accountable for providing it.<sup>45</sup>

This practically mirrors the discussion of the necessity of critical reasoning for the company grade officer. The manual goes on to say that “organizational leaders also know how to bring to bear the effectiveness of all available systems to achieve mission success.”<sup>46</sup> Again, as with the need to be able to influence the actions and decisions of

others, the need to understand systems and how the variables within the system interact virtually restates the skills needed for the company grade officer.

Finally, Field Manual 22-100 highlights one additional skill necessary for the organizational leader that directly applies to skills learned as a company grade officer. "Organizational leaders...must master the tactical skills of synchronization and orchestration."<sup>47</sup> To accomplish this, the organizational leader must build on the skills discussed earlier for the company grade officer. Specifically, he must take his ability to integrate other maneuver units, and combat support units into a maneuver plan developed at the company grade level, and evolve this skill into an ability to synchronize the actions of these same type units as well as combat service support units into a feasible plan. It will be very difficult for the field grade officer to synchronize the actions of all of the battlefield operating systems without having some experience at the company grade level as a company team commander having to integrate the capabilities of numerous different assets.

In summary, although all skills that the company grade officer develops will be helpful to him as a field grade officer, it is shown that some skills will be more applicable to him as a field grade officer than others. Specifically, his ability to influence others (interpersonal skill); his ability to critically reason (conceptual skill); and his ability to integrate attached units (tactical skill) will be more applicable to him than the other skills developed as a company grade officer. This discussion of which skills will most assist the company grade officer as he is moved into positions as an organizational leader will assist us in analyzing the impact that a shift to a MOOTW-based METL will have on the leader development of the company grade officer later in this monograph.



## **COMPANY GRADE SKILLS VERSUS WARFIGHTING-BASED METL**

In order to compare the skills developed by the company grade officer training in a unit with a warfighting-based METL against an officer training in a unit training with a MOOTW-based METL, each component of each skill will be rated as trained to a high, medium or low level. These ratings are defined as follows:

A component is considered trained to a high level if all of the sub-components are viewed as being trained in a warfighting-based METL. In those components that do not have sub-components, such as knowing own equipment and employment of organic equipment, the component can only be rated as trained to a high or low level.

A component is considered trained to a medium-level if fifty percent or more of the sub-components, but less than all of the sub-components are viewed as trained in a warfighting-based METL. For example, for the influence component of the interpersonal skill, the ability to influence international soldiers and contractors was viewed as trained, whereas the ability to influence NGOs was viewed as untrained. Thus two of three sub-components were viewed as trained and the medium level of development was given to that component.

A component is considered trained to a low level of proficiency if less than fifty percent of the sub-components are considered trained. As stated above, components without sub-components are viewed either as trained to a high or low level.

Currently, the Army focuses its unit training on a warfighting-based METL in preparation for high-intensity operations such as Operation DESERT STORM and Operation JUST CAUSE. "Commanders determine their unit's METLs based on war plans and external directives. War plans consist of the unit's anticipated wartime missions."<sup>48</sup> The components of each skill discussed earlier will be examined in turn to

determine the level of development expected from a company grade officer training in a unit preparing for a MTW scenario. Later, this development will be compared to officer development expected for an officer training in a unit using a MOOTW-based METL to assist in determining the impact that a shift in training strategy would have. In order to conduct this analysis, an assumption must be made. This assumption is that units would indeed create a METL that would successfully prepare their units for a MTW scenario such as DESERT STORM and JUST CAUSE.<sup>49</sup> This assumption is necessary so that the operations can be used as examples of skills an officer should develop if his METL tasks are chosen correctly.

The first skill to be discussed is the interpersonal skill. As stated earlier, a company grade officer needs interpersonal skills in order to influence the actions of people and organizations outside of his direct control; to interact with people and organizations transiting or working within the area of operations; and to direct the actions of his subordinates. The first component of interpersonal skill, the ability to influence is developed to a medium level of development.

First, a company grade officer will often train with soldiers and units from other countries in an expectation of operating in a multi-national context in actual combat. Exercises such as BRIGHT STAR conducted in Egypt highlight this point. Although the officer will not normally command and control soldiers from other countries, he will need to have the ability to effectively communicate with soldiers of other countries. Thus the officer's ability to influence the actions of soldiers from other nations will certainly be developed.

Second, units deploying to the National Training Center or to the Joint Readiness Training Center deploy with numerous contractors to assist in the maintenance of the various weapon and command and control systems. This interaction on a routine basis with these contractors and the learned ability to influence their actions, although they are not directly under their command, is important for success on future battlefields and will be trained using a warfighting-based METL.

The only component of the interpersonal skill as described above that the soldier will not normally develop is the ability to influence the actions of NGOs. The nature of high-intensity conflicts, in terms of the size and purpose of the operation, place NGOs outside the concern of company grade officers. For example, Operation DESERT STORM consisted of two U.S. corps. Any interaction with these organizations will normally be left to officers assigned to higher headquarters.

The interact component of the interpersonal skill will not be developed in the company grade officer for the same reasons. Company grade officers normally will not have great interaction with the media or the people in the area of operations due to the availability of higher headquarters to handle such concerns. High-intensity conflicts, unlike MOOTW, are normally conducted by divisions or multiple divisions. The availability of this large command structure shields the company grade officer, to a large extent from the media and interaction with the people within the area of operation.

Unlike interaction with the media and people in the area of operation, company grade officers will develop their ability to direct the actions of their subordinates to a high degree. The combat arms officer will conduct numerous maneuver, live-fire and

simulation exercises to hone his ability to make decisions and relay his intent to his subordinates clearly and rapidly.

The next skill to discuss is the conceptual skill and its components: critical reasoning and creative thinking. As mentioned earlier, critical reasoning involved understanding the details of a problem, an ability to mediate and negotiate, and an ability to manage large amounts of information. Creative thinking involved the ability to make decisions with little guidance and to solve unusual problems outside the problem set discussed in doctrine. The officer will develop the ability to critically reason to a medium level of development in a warfighting-based METL.

First, the combat arms, company grade officer will develop an ability to understand the details of a problem and to see the "big picture" while training within a warfighting-based METL. This will normally be confined to a big picture view of the battlefield environment. The company grade officer will develop an understanding of the concept of "nesting" or how his mission fits into the mission and intent of the commander one and two levels above his own.

Second, the ability of the company grade officer to mediate or negotiate with civilians within the area of operation will in all probability not be developed. The mission of the military units conducting offensive and defensive operations normally does not necessitate negotiating or mediating, especially at the company grade level.

Third, the combat arms officer will develop the ability to manage information. In preparation for high-intensity conflict, the combat officer is trained on how to determine the information he needs about the enemy and terrain he is about to operate on. He also learns how to prioritize the acquisition of this intelligence to ensure he obtains the

information he needs with the resources available to him in order to assist in his decision-making. Because only two of three sub-components of critical reasoning will be developed it is given the rating as developed to a medium level.

As defined earlier, the combat officer will not develop his ability to think creatively. The combat arms officer, especially at the company grade level, extensively trains to battle drills, which allow his unit to rapidly react to numerous situations. The battle drills honed at the Combat Training Centers are necessary, and as Operation DESERT STORM proved, very successful. "The soldiers I spoke to in Iraq after the war's end credited their National Training Center experience with giving them the confidence they needed on the eve of battle. Many said that the Iraqis were not as proficient in combat as were the NTC Opposing Forces soldiers."<sup>50</sup> These battle drills, along with the large amount of doctrine available to the warfighter, gives him a great advantage in combat situations, but does not force a great deal of creative thinking on his part.

Technical skill was described above as comprised of three components: knowing own equipment, knowing attached equipment, and maximizing the use of digital C2 systems. The combat officer training to a warfighting-METL develops all components of the technical skill to a high-level of proficiency. Throughout his time as a company grade officer he is expected to have a complete understanding of his equipment, its capabilities and its limitations. As he rises in rank he will be given the opportunity to be a company team commander and develop his knowledge of equipment outside of his own unit. This equipment includes artillery, air defense and engineer equipment. At the end

of his tenure as a company commander, he will have gained significant knowledge of all of this equipment.

As the company grade officer trains to fight a MTW scenario, he will make extensive use of available digital command and control systems and learn how to maximize the capabilities of these systems. "Army leaders must be able to fully exploit the opportunities that command systems...provide."<sup>51</sup> In a manner similar to technical skill development, combat arms officers will develop a high degree of tactical skill while training for a MTW scenario. The numerous training events both at home station and at Combat Training Centers focus on the combat arms officer's ability to employ his unit in a combat environment and to integrate the capabilities of attached units into his plan.

Figure 2 summarizes the above discussion of skill development of the combat officer training in a unit using a warfighting-based METL.

	High level of Development	Medium level of Development	Low level of Development
<b>Interpersonal Skill</b>			
Influence		X	
Interact			X
Direct	X		
<b>Conceptual Skill</b>			
Critical Reasoning		X	
Creative Thinking			X
<b>Technical Skill</b>			
Knowing Own Equipment	X		
Knowing Attached Equipment	X		
Maximize use of Digital C2 Systems	X		
<b>Tactical Skill</b>			
Employment of Organic Equipment	X		
Integrate Attached Units	X		

Figure 2. Company Grade Officer Development of Skills in Units Using Warfighting-based METL.

## **COMPANY GRADE SKILLS VERSUS MOOTW-BASED METL**

The same examination of skills required of combat arms, company grade officers will now be done against the skills that the officer can be expected to develop when training in a unit using a MOOTW-based METL.<sup>52</sup> MOOTW-based METLs would be used to prepare units for operations such as those the Army conducted or is conducting in Bosnia, Kosovo and Somalia.

Company grade officers training in units preparing for MOOTW will develop their interpersonal skill to a high level. First, the strategic environment drives the United States to build consensus and legitimacy for participation in stability and support operations and almost guarantees that such operations will be multinational in nature. In Bosnia, officers in Task Force Eagle learned that "with more than 30 different nations participating, it was a significant challenge to merge the cultural perspectives to achieve unity of effort and avoid cultural clashes."<sup>53</sup> Further, the success of the United States' participation in these operation make it imperative that military officers can influence the actions of the soldiers of other nations. Additionally, stability and support operations normally have a small contingent of American units participating, often brigade-sized and below. The small number of forces involved, as well as the need for company and platoon-sized elements to operate separate from their higher headquarters make the possibility of company grade officers having to work with foreign nation's armed forces very likely.

The need for company grade officers to influence the actions of contractors is great in MOOTW operations. Not only will company grade officers interact with contractors needed to maintain their equipment, but they will also need to influence the actions of a great deal of other contractors. Because MOOTW are normally conducted in

areas that have an extremely limited infrastructure, contractors will be hired to build infrastructure and provide services within the area of operations. Understanding how these contractors operate and how to influence their actions is of paramount importance for the success of United States operations.

The mission of units conducting stability or support operations differs greatly from units conducting offensive or defensive operations. In large part, the success of the military's involvement in stability or support operations relies heavily on the ability of the units to assist in the relief of human suffering or the rebuilding of destroyed infrastructure. "The political, civil, economic, and humanitarian aspects of peace operations require close cooperation between the civil organizations and the military."<sup>54</sup> Much of this work involves working with NGOs. The need for a small amount of military forces to spread out throughout a relatively large area of operations necessitates that company grade officers train to interact with these NGOs. The ability to influence their operations by describing the need of the people and to demonstrate how their actions can assist in progressing the cause of the people in the area is a necessity.

As with the officer's ability to influence people and organizations outside of his direct control that contribute to the success of his unit, the company grade officer will also interact with others not under his control. These people include media representatives and people living in or transiting the area of operations. As described earlier, the decentralized nature of stability or support operations and the mission of the military in stability or support operations create a situation where company grade officers will often interact with the media. During Exercise Mountain Eagle, company grade



officers down to platoon level were trained in how to plan for and react to a press interview.<sup>55</sup>

Not only will officers interact with the media often during stability or support operations, they will also often interact with people within the area of operations. This interaction will often take the form of mediation or negotiation between two parties in order to settle a dispute. This type of training took place during Exercise Mountain Eagle. Each officer at the company grade level was trained in how to "conduct liaison/negotiation."<sup>56</sup>

An officer's ability to direct his subordinates will also be trained to a high level of proficiency in the company grade officer. The very nature of the decentralized operations that stability and support operations entail makes it imperative that the company grade officer be able to communicate the purpose of his subordinate's operations and clearly communicate his intent.

As with interpersonal skills, the officer training for MOOTW will also develop his conceptual skills to a high level of proficiency. In respect to understanding the depth of the problem, the company grade officer not only must understand how his mission nests with the mission and intent of his higher headquarters, but also he must understand how the United States' involvement relates to the overall success of the country's security strategy. Additionally, to be successful the officer must understand the nature of the cause of the conflict that led to the instability within the area of operation as well as the aims, complaints and history of each group within his area of operations. This requirement requires a great deal of study and mental preparation on the part of the officer.

MOOTW not only require the officer to study the history of the region and the nature and causes of the conflict but also requires him to apply this knowledge during negotiations and mediation. This may require the officer to think quickly through the problem, understand the variables of the problem, how these variables relate to one another and how a change to one of the variables will impact on the other variables. In short, the officer must take a systems view to many of the problems he encounters.

The officer will also need to manage a great deal of information while conducting his operations. The problem that the officer faces however, is knowing exactly what type of information he requires. This requirement is significantly different from the problem an officer faces in a high-intensity conflict in which information normally deals with enemy composition and disposition or related information. In MOOTW, economic, political or demographic information may take primacy. This requires mental flexibility on the part of the officer to think through potential issues and determine his information requirements.

Along with critical reasoning, creative thinking may be the most important ingredient for the success of an officer in MOOTW. The dispersed nature of the typical stability or support operations, the relative lack of doctrine available to the officer and the almost limitless conditions in which the officer may face during a stability or support operations requires the officer to develop his own "non-doctrinal" solutions<sup>57</sup>.

The level of proficiency that the officer will develop in technical skill is less than the level of proficiency he will achieve in interpersonal and conceptual skills. The officer, in most situations, will operate with his organic equipment giving him the necessary proficiency in understanding the capabilities and limitations of his equipment.

However this is not always the case, especially for armor officers. Units deploying to Macedonia left their equipment at home and instead used HWMMVs.<sup>58</sup>

Compounding this problem is the fact that units in a stability or support operation normally do not operate as combined arms teams, but as pure units.<sup>59</sup> This prevents the officer from developing an understanding of the capabilities of the equipment belonging to organizations other than his own.

The officer, assuming that he deploys with the type of equipment organic to his organization, will learn how to use digital command and control systems, but because of the type of operations he is operating in, probably will not learn the full extent of their capability. For example because of the terrain, "enemy", and dispersed nature of operations in Bosnia, Joint STARS was not used to feed information through the division and brigades to the company grade officer.<sup>60</sup> This lack of experience of receiving, filtering and understanding enemy information being provided by higher headquarters is significant.

Turning to tactical skill, even though MOOTW are not noted for large scale offensive and defensive operations, at the company grade level, the officer will attain a high level of proficiency on how to employ his unit in a combat situation in the eventuality that this skill is necessary. For example, during Exercise Mountain Eagle, platoon leaders were trained on how to "conduct patrols, react to ambush, and react to indirect fire", tasks that require expert knowledge in the employment of the officer's unit.<sup>61</sup>

The officer will not attain a high proficiency in the integration of attached units however. As discussed earlier, units will normally operate "pure" in stability or support

operations and will not normally integrate outside units to conduct combined-arms offenses or defenses.

Figure 3 summarizes the skills that the company grade officer will develop in a unit using a MOOTW-based METL. The criteria for each rating are the same as discussed earlier for figure 2.

	High level of Development	Medium level of Development	Low level of Development
<b>Interpersonal Skill</b>			
Influence	X		
Interact	X		
Direct	X		
<b>Conceptual Skill</b>			
Critical Reasoning	X		
Creative Thinking	X		
<b>Technical Skill</b>			
Knowing Own Equipment	X		
Knowing Attached Equipment			X
Maximize use of Digital C2 Systems			X
<b>Tactical Skill</b>			
Employment of Organic Equipment	X		
Integrate Attached Units			X

Figure 3. Company Grade Officer Development Skills in Units Using MOOTW-based METL

#### COMPARISON OF SKILLS DEVELOPED IN THE COMPANY GRADE OFFICER

In comparing the skills developed in a company grade combat arms officer training in a unit with a warfighting-based METL to an officer training in a unit with a MOOTW-based METL, significant differences in skills developed are clear. Figure 4 consolidates the skills developed in each type of METL.

	High level of Development	Medium level of Development	Low level of Development
<b>Interpersonal Skill</b>			
Influence	x	<b>X</b>	
Interact	x		<b>X</b>
Direct	x/X		
<b>Conceptual Skill</b>			
Critical Reasoning	x	<b>X</b>	
Creative Thinking	x		<b>X</b>
<b>Technical Skill</b>			
Knowing Own Equipment	x/X		
Knowing Attached Equipment	<b>X</b>		x
Maximize use of Digital C2 Systems	<b>X</b>		x
<b>Tactical Skill</b>			
Employment of Organic Equipment	x/X		
Integrate Attached Units	<b>X</b>		x
<b>X = Warfighting-based METL</b> <b>x = MOOTW-based METL</b>			

Figure 4. Comparison of Skills Developed

Figure 4 clearly demonstrates the differences in the skills developed in the company grade officer in each METL strategy. The warfighting-based METL better develops the technical and tactical skills that the company grade officer requires. The MOOTW-based METL, on the other hand, better develops the interpersonal and conceptual skills.

#### DEPLOYMENT TIMELINES

A final piece of information must be considered before the criteria are applied and a conclusion is arrived at. That information is the amount of time that units have between being alerted for an operation and the actual time that they deploy. Operation DESERT STORM is an excellent example of deployment timelines for a MTW scenario. In this

instance, the Iraqis attacked Kuwait on August 1, 1990. At that time, the XVIII Airborne Corps was alerted for possible deployment. The first combat soldiers from the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division began arriving in Saudi Arabia on August 7, 1990; six days later. This was not unique to only the airborne soldiers of the corps. The 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division was also alerted on August 1st, its heavy equipment began to load onto ships at the Port of Savannah on August 12, 1990 and soldiers began to arrive in theater within the month.<sup>62</sup> Thus, although individual training was conducted between the time of alert and actual deployment into theater, the unit, as far as unit-level proficiency was concerned, deployed to theater without significant additional training. It is noted that once in theater, the units of the XVIII Airborne Corps were allowed time to train because Iraqi forces did not continue its attack south into Saudi Arabia. The point here, however, is that forces preparing for a MTW scenario must be ready to deploy on short notice and conduct combat operations upon arrival in theater.

The nature of stability operations is much different as far as deployment is concerned. The United States' normal policy is not to commit soldiers into a theater unless it is a permissive environment. This fact alone normally offers a great deal of time for units identified for deployment to conduct training while negotiations are on-going. Additionally, once the initial force package is in place, units identified for rotation into theater to relieve the original force also has a relatively long amount of time to prepare for the mission. This fact is highlighted by a recent announcement made by the Army in October of 1999 that announced the unit rotation plan for Bosnia through April of 2003.<sup>63</sup>

## **ANALYSIS**

Earlier, three criteria were defined that would be used to determine whether changing to a MOOTW-based METL strategy would have a negative impact on company grade combat arms officers. These criteria were responsiveness, preparedness for future assignments and readiness. Each of these criteria will be discussed in turn.

### **RESPONSIVENESS**

This criterion is defined as the time that units historically have been given, from alert to deployment. As shown, one of the goals of the officer development process, specifically through operational assignments, is to prepare the officer to assist his unit in accomplishing its mission. Thus, for this criteria, an officer should be trained on those skills that he needs to support operations requiring immediate deployment, and be trained in skills needed for operations with more time before deployment once an alert order is given.

The above discussion shows that normally, offensive and defensive operations have a significantly shorter notice for deployment. Thus, using responsiveness as a criteria, the company grade officer should be trained following a warfighting-based METL, and only train according to a MOOTW-based METL upon notification that a deployment in support of stability or support operations are imminent.

Presently, the Army uses MREs to conduct this training, although the length of these MREs varies according to the time available. According to one officer that has participated in an MRE, his MRE in preparation for deployment to Bosnia lasted four weeks. He felt that within the MRE time period all of the necessary skills necessary for successful mission accomplishment by the company grade officers were accomplished.<sup>64</sup>

## PREPAREDNESS FOR FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

A second goal of the officer development process is to prepare officers for follow-on assignments. As shown earlier, several skills needed as a company grade officer were also shown to be critical to the field grade officer. These skills were: ability to influence others; ability to critically reason; and his ability to integrate attached units. Figure 5 compares the level of development for a company grade officer training under both METL strategies for the three critical skills identified for use as a field grade officer.

	High level of Development	Medium level of Development	Low level of Development
<b>Interpersonal Skill</b>			
Influence	x	X	
<b>Conceptual Skill</b>			
Critical Reasoning	x	X	
<b>Tactical Skill</b>			
Integrate Attached Units	X		x

X = Warfighting-based METL

x = MOOTW-based METL

Figure 5. Comparison of skill development to support future assignments.

Figure 5 shows that a warfighting-based METL better prepares the company grade, combat arms officer for future assignments. Although the MOOTW-based METL better develops the officer in terms of his ability to influence and his ability to critically reason, the warfighting-based METL does develop these skills in the officer to some degree. However, the fact that the officer receive little or no development in his ability to integrate attached units is something that may not be able to be overcome as a field grade



officer when he is responsible for synchronizing the actions of numerous units that he was not exposed to as a company grade officer.

#### **READY**

Earlier, the criterion of “ready” was defined to examine the type of METL that better prepares an officer to be ready for all types of operations. Included in this criterion is the complexity of the skills developed and the mental flexibility that these skills provide the officer. A MOOTW-based METL is the preferred strategy for leader development according to the definition of this criterion.

When comparing the skills that an officer would better develop within a MOOTW-based METL, it has been shown that the officer better develops the interpersonal and conceptual skills. These skills, especially the conceptual skill provides an incredible advantage to the officer. In training to operate in a MOOTW environment, the officer learns to analyze complex systems, react to greatly varied military as well as economic and political environments and develop solutions to many problems that have no “doctrinal” solutions.

The ability to operate within complex systems and the mental flexibility developed in officers training under a MOOTW-based METL can carry over to varied types of missions. The bottom line is that an officer that has highly developed conceptual skills will be better able to operate across the spectrum of conflict to include offensive and defensive operations.

## CONCLUSIONS

The current strategic environment has changed the focus of the armed forces of the United States. A decade ago, the United States' military was focused primarily on deterring Soviet Union aggression in Western Europe. The need to focus on the Soviet Union dissolved in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Since then, the world was to become a more stable environment and the need for large armed forces believed to be diminished.

The realities of the 1990's however have been significantly different. "Since 1989, the number of Army deployments has grown by over 300%, yet the Army's Active and Reserve Components have shrunk by over 40%."<sup>65</sup> This increased operational tempo and reduced force structure has created a debate within the Army.

One side of the debate is that the Army should change its current unit training strategy from a warfighting-based METL to a MOOTW-based METL. The advantage of this new strategy is that it prepares units to deploy quickly, without additional training for a multitude of stability and support operations. The main advantage is that the Army would be trained and ready to operate in operations that the Army is most likely to encounter.

The other side of the debate is that the Army should continue to train as it has in the past, using a warfighting-based METL. This type of strategy keeps the Army ready to respond to the type of crisis situations that are most dangerous to the United States, namely an MTW scenario operations such as Operation DESERT STORM. The argument has been that if the Army trains and is prepared for high-intensity conflicts, it can still successfully operate in any lesser type operation such as stability and support operations.

This monograph explored the impact that a shift in strategy from a warfighting-based METL to a MOOTW-based METL would have on the leader development of combat arms, company grade officer. The question that the monograph answers is whether a shift to a MOOTW-based METL would negatively impact on the officer. The answer is that a shift to a MOOTW-based METL would not negatively impact on the officer.

It is clear that a shift in METL strategy would certainly train different skills. Specifically, the officer would better develop his interpersonal and conceptual skills at the expense of his technical and tactical skills. However, the ability of an officer to better analyze complex systems and develop solutions to a wide variety of problems that require him to analyze military, economic and political considerations cannot be seen as negative.

However, caution must be taken when considering the above statement. Specifically, as with most decisions that chooses between two options there are both advantages and disadvantages. The disadvantage to a shift from a warfighting-METL to a MOOTW-based METL is that the officer will be less developed in his technical and tactical skills. This is off-set by the fact that the officer would develop these skills to some degree, but not to the extent that he would in a unit training with a warfighting-based METL.

In the end, however, despite its disadvantages, an officer with better interpersonal and conceptual skills is often preferable to an officer with better tactical and technical skills. This fact alone prevents one from stating that a shift from a warfighting-based

METL to a MOOTW-based METL would have a negative impact on the development of company grade, combat arms officers.

ENDNOTES:

<sup>1</sup> Burrows, Bernard and Edwards, Geoffrey, The Defence of Western Europe, Butterworth Scientific, London, 1982, 1.

<sup>2</sup> "DOD Active Duty Military Personnel Strength Levels: Fiscal Years 1950-1997," (<http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmids/military/trends.htm>). Accessed 25 October 1999. The personnel strength shown is for 1989.

<sup>3</sup> "DOD Active Duty Military Personnel Strength Levels: Fiscal Years 1950-1997," (<http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmids/military/trends.htm>). Accessed 25 October 1999.

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Force XXI Operations, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5. Government Printing Office: Fort Monroe, August 1994, 2-9.

<sup>5</sup> The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. Government Printing Office: Washington D.C., October 1998, 1.

<sup>6</sup> Caldera Louis and Shinseki, Eric K. "The Army Vision: Soldiers on Point for the Nation...Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War," (<http://www.Army.mil/CSAVision/default.html>), October 1999. Accessed 25 October 1999.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>8</sup> "Balancing Operations, Leadership, and Training Doctrine," (<http://www-cgsc.Army.mil/operations/ConceptPapers/CP5r.pdf>). Accessed 7 September 1999.

<sup>9</sup> Hughes, Chris. "Peace Operations Training Vignettes with Possible Solutions," (<http://call.Army.mil/call/vignettes/haiti/forward.htm>). Accessed 5 November 1999.

<sup>10</sup> United States Marine Corps Lessons Learned. "Bosnia: Operation Joint Endeavor, Lessons Learned Summary," (<http://www.oow.quantico.usmc.m>). Accessed 5 November 1999.

<sup>11</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3. Government Printing Office: Washington D.C., 1 October 1998, 3.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>16</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, Leader Development for America's Army: The Enduring Legacy, Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-58. Government Printing Office: Washington D.C., 13 October 1994, 25.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 25.

<sup>18</sup> U. S. Department of the Army, Army Leadership, Field Manual 22-100, Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., June 1999, 3-24.

---

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., chapter 4. FM 22-100 goes on to explain skills for the direct leader for each of its categories, these skills could not be used in the monograph because they are general in nature since they apply to all leaders from possibly battalion commander to team leader.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 1-4.

<sup>21</sup> "History of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina," (<http://www.nato.int/sfor/docu/d981116a.htm>). Accessed 5 November 1999.

<sup>22</sup> Young, David L. "Planning: The Key to Contractors on the Battlefield," (<http://www.almc.Army.mil/alog/MayJun99/MS344.htm>). Accessed 5 November 1999.

<sup>23</sup> Shamir, Boas and Ben-Ari, Eyal, "Leadership in an Open Army? Civilian Connections, Interorganizational Frameworks, and Changes in Military Leadership." In *Out-of-the-Box Leadership: Transforming the Twenty-Century-Century Army and Other Top-Performing Organizations*, ed. James G. Hunt, George E. Dodge and Leonard Wong, Jai Press Inc., Stamford, Connecticut, 1999, p. 24.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 23.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 36.

<sup>26</sup> FM 22-100, 4-2.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 1-4.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 4-5.

<sup>29</sup> Senge, P.M., *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization*, Doubleday, New York, 1990, chapter 4.

<sup>30</sup> Ogilvie, D.T and Fabian, F.H., "Decision-Making Requirements for Future Organizational Leaders: A Creative Action-Based Approach." In *Out-of-the-Box Leadership: Transforming the Twenty-Century-Century Army and Other Top-Performing Organizations*, ed. James G. Hunt, George E. Dodge and Leonard Wong, Jai Press Inc., Stamford, Connecticut, 1999, 70.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 70.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 67.

<sup>34</sup> FM 22-100, 4-7.

<sup>35</sup> Shamir and Ben-Ari, 30.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 27.

<sup>37</sup> FM 22-100, 1-4.

<sup>38</sup> U.S. Department of the Army. *Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team*. Field Manual 71-1. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., January 1998, 1-1.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 1-4, 4-12.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 6-2.

---

<sup>41</sup> DA PAM 350-58, 25.

<sup>42</sup> Earlier it was stated that the skills discussed in FM 22-100 for the direct leader was insufficient in detail due to the broad range of ranks that the direct leader encompasses. This is not true however for the discussion of organizational leaders. This discussion is more focused and this author believes to be an adequate discussion of skills required of the field grade officer.

<sup>43</sup> FM 22-100, 6-5.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 6-5.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 6-10.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 6-10.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 6-13.

<sup>48</sup> U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. *Battle Focus Training*, Field Manual 25-101. Government Printing Office: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, September 1990, 2-3.

<sup>49</sup> The author has available to him numerous armor battalion and armor company METLs from his experience as an observer/controller at the National Training Center from 1994 through 1996.

<sup>50</sup> Blackwell, James. *Thunder in the Desert: The Strategy and Tactics of the Persian Gulf War*, New York: Bantam Books, 1991, 218.

<sup>51</sup> TRADOC PAM 525-5, 4-4.

<sup>52</sup> The author has available to him a METL used by infantry companies and battalions as they prepared for operations in the Balkans during Exercise Mountain Eagle.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> "Observer Controller Packet – Exercise Mountain Eagle," ([http://160.149.150.44/cgi-bin/cqcggi/@de\\_DE3\]=RWP-05-27278&CQLIBID=16&CQSRCHLIB=1](http://160.149.150.44/cgi-bin/cqcggi/@de_DE3]=RWP-05-27278&CQLIBID=16&CQSRCHLIB=1)). Accessed 26 October 1999.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> On the Army Digital Library, there are twelve armor field manuals and seventeen infantry field manuals dealing with tactical doctrine, which the author believed, were applicable to the company grade officer. Of these manuals, none of the armor field manuals and only three of the infantry manuals were dedicated to MOOTW. Although manuals such as FM 71-1, *Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team* contain sections on stability and support operations, the obvious disparity in the number of doctrinal manuals dealing with high-intensity conflicts versus stability operations is significant.

<sup>58</sup> Rubitsky, MAJ Scott, Student, Advanced Military Studies Program, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas., interviewed by the author 22 November 1999.

<sup>59</sup> Piscal, MAJ Richard, Instructor of tactics at CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, interviewed by the author 21 November 1999.

---

<sup>60</sup> Agee, Collin A. "Joint STARS in Bosnia: Too Much Data, Too Little Intel?," MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. October-December 1996, 6-10, 40-41.

<sup>61</sup> "Observer Controller Packet – Exercise Mountain Eagle."

<sup>62</sup> Gordon, Michael R. and Trainor Bernard E. *The General's War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995, 30-64.

<sup>63</sup> "Army Announces Unit Rotation Plan for Bosnia," (<http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs99/r19991026sfor.htm>), 26 October 1999. Accessed 5 November 1999.

<sup>64</sup>Piscal.

<sup>65</sup> "Army Announces Unit Rotation Plan for Bosnia".



## BIBLIOGRAPHY:

### BOOKS and PERIODICALS:

- Agee, Collin A., "Joint STARS in Bosnia: Too Much Data, Too Little Intel?," MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, October-December 1996, pp. 6-10, 40-41.
- Allard, Kenneth. *Command, Control, and the Common Defense*. Washington: National Defense University, 1996.
- Bass, Bernard M. *A New Paradigm of Leadership: An Inquiry Into Transformational Leadership*. Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1996.
- Blackwell, James. *Thunder in the Desert: The Strategy and Tactics of the Persian Gulf War*. New York: Bantam Books, 1991.
- Brown, F.J. *The U.S. Army in Transition II: Landpower in the Information Age*. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1993.
- Burns, T., and Stalker, G.M. *The Management of Innovation*. London: Tavistock, 1961.
- Burrows, Bernard and Edwards, Geoffrey. *The Defence of Western Europe*. London: Butterworth Scientific, 1982.
- Bush, George and Scowcroft, Brent. *A World Transformed*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998.
- Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Dunnigan, J.F. *How to Make War: A Comprehensive Guide to Modern Warfare for the Post-Cold War Era*. New York: William Morrow, 1993.
- Glazer, R., Steckel, J. H. and Winer, R. S., "Locally Rational Decision Making: The Distracting Effect of Information on Managerial Performance," MANAGEMENT SCIENCE Vol. 38, 1992, pp 212-226.
- Gordon, Michael R. and Trainor Bernard E., *The General's War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995.
- Graen, George and Hui, Chun. "U.S. Army Leadership in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges and Implications for Training." In *Out-of-the-Box Leadership: Transforming the Twenty-First-Century Army and Other Top-Performing Organizations*, ed. James G. Hunt, George E. Dodge and Leonard Wong, 239-252. Stamford, Connecticut: Jai Press Inc., 1999.

- Hunt, James G. and Blair, John D. *Leadership on the Future Battlefield*. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1985.
- Marshall, Samuel Lyman Atwood. *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future Warfare*. Gloucester: Massachusetts, 1978.
- McCall M. W., Lombardo, M. M., and Morrison, A. *The Lessons of Experience*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988.
- Newman, Aubrey S. *Follow Me: The Human Element in Leadership*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1981.
- Oglivie, D.T and Fabian, F.H.. "Decision-Making Requirements for Future Organizational Leaders: A Creative Action-Based Approach." In *Out-of-the-Box Leadership: Transforming the Twenty-Century-Century Army and Other Top-Performing Organizations*, ed. James G. Hunt, Geroge E. Dodge and Leonard Wong, 63-89. Stamford, Connecticut: Jai Press Inc., 1999.
- Senge, P.M. *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization*. New York: Doubleday, 1990.
- Shamir, Boas and Ben-Ari, Eyal. "Leadership in an Open Army? Civilian Connections, Interorganizational Frameworks, and Changes in Military Leadership." In *Out-of-the-Box Leadership: Transforming the Twenty-Century-Century Army and Other Top-Performing Organizations*, ed. James G. Hunt, Geroge E. Dodge and Leonard Wong, 15-38. Stamford, Connecticut: Jai Press Inc., 1999.
- Sullivan, Gordon. "From Theory to Practice." In *Out-of-the-Box Leadership: Transforming the Twenty-Century-Century Army and Other Top-Performing Organizations*, ed. James G. Hunt, Geroge E. Dodge and Leonard Wong, xv-xxiii. Stamford, Connecticut: Jai Press Inc., 1999.
- Sullivan, Gordon. *Hope is not a Method: What Business Leaders can Learn from America's Army*. New York: Random House, 1996.
- U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. *Training the Force: Battle Focus Training*, Field Manual 25-100. Government Printing Office: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, September 1990.
- U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. *Battle Focus Training*, Field Manual 25-101. Government Printing Office: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, September 1990.
- U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. *Force XXI Operations*, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5. Government Printing Office: Fort Monroe, August 1994.

U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Vision 2010*. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1996.

U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Leadership*. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., June 1999.

U.S. Department of the Army. *Operations*. Field Manual 100-5. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., June 1993.

U.S. Department of the Army. *Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team*. Field Manual 71-1. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., January 1998.

U.S. Department of the Army. *Leader Development for America's Army: The Enduring Legacy*. Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-58. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., October 1994.

U.S. Department of the Army. *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*. Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., October 1998.

The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. Government Printing Office: Washington D.C., October 1998.

Yukl, Gary. "Leadership Competencies Required for the New Army and Approaches for Developing Them." In *Out-of-the-Box Leadership: Transforming the Twenty-Century-Century Army and Other Top-Performing Organizations*, ed. James G. Hunt, Geroge E. Dodge and Leonard Wong, 255-276. Stamford, Connecticut: Jai Press Inc., 1999.

#### INTERNET:

"Army Announces Unit Rotation Plan for Bosnia," (<http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs99/r19991026sfor.htm>), 26 October 1999. Accessed 5 November 1999.

"Balancing Operations, Leadership, and Training Doctrine," (<http://www-cgsc.army.mil/operations/ConceptPapers/CP5r.pdf>). Accessed 7 September 1999.

Caldera Louis and Shinseki, Eric K. "The Army Vision: Soldiers on Point for the Nation...Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War," (<http://www.army.mil/CSAVision/default.html>), October 1999. Accessed 25 October 1999.

Center for Army Lessons Learned. "Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Sustainment Training," (<http://call.army.mil/call/newsletters/97-12/sust4wd.htm>). Accessed 5 November 1999.

Center for Army Lessons Learned. "Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Civil

Disturbance Operations,” (<http://call.army.mil/call/newsltrs/96-11/sec3.htm>). Accessed 5 November 1999.

Center for Army Lessons Learned. “Chronology for IFOR Events: Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience,” ([http://call.army.mil/call/spc\\_prod/ccrp/lessons/bosappb.htm](http://call.army.mil/call/spc_prod/ccrp/lessons/bosappb.htm)). Accessed 5 November 1999.

“DOD Active Duty Military Personnel Strength Levels: Fiscal Years 1950-1997,” (<http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmids/military/trends.htm>). Accessed 25 October 1999.

“History of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” (<http://www.nato.int/sfor/docu/d981116a.htm>). Accessed 5 November 1999.

“History of Task Force Eagle,” (<http://www.tfeweb.5sigcmd.army.mil/eagle/TFEHistory.htm>). Accessed 5 November 1999.

Hughes, Chris. “Peace Operations Training Vignettes with Possible Solutions,” (<http://call.army.mil/call/vignettes/haiti/forward.htm>). Accessed 5 November 1999.

“Observer Controller Packet – Exercise Mountain Eagle,” ([http://160.149.150.44/cgi-bin/cqcgil/@de\\_DE3\]=RWP-05-27278&CQLIBID=16&CQSRCHLIB=1](http://160.149.150.44/cgi-bin/cqcgil/@de_DE3]=RWP-05-27278&CQLIBID=16&CQSRCHLIB=1)). Accessed 26 October 1999.

“Statement by the President on Kosovo,” (<http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs99/990405-wh1.htm>), 5 April 1999. Accessed 5 November 1999.

United States Marine Corps Lessons Learned. “Bosnia: Operation Joint Endeavor, Lessons Learned Summary,” (<http://www.oow.quantico.usmc.m>). Accessed 5 November 1999.

Walley, Jim. “The Heavy Infantry Battalion in Peace Operations,” (<http://call.army.mil/call/nftf/may94/may94.htm>), May 1994. Accessed 26 October 1999.

Wentz, Larry K. “Summary: Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience,” ([http://call.army.mil/call/spc\\_prod/ccrp/lessons/bosch14.htm](http://call.army.mil/call/spc_prod/ccrp/lessons/bosch14.htm)). Accessed 5 November 1999.

Young, David L. “Planning: The Key to Contractors on the Battlefield,” (<http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/MayJun99/MS344.htm>). Accessed 5 November 1999.

## **INTERVIEWS:**

Piscal, MAJ Richard, Instructor of tactics at CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, interviewed by the author 21 November 1999. MAJ Piscal was the Regimental S3 for the 2 ACR and served in Bosnia in support of Operation JOINT GUARD from October 1997 to June 1998.

Rubitsky, MAJ Scott, Student, Advanced Military Studies Program, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas., interviewed by the author 22 November 1999. MAJ Rubitsky was deployed to Macedonia for seven months while participating in Operation ABLE SENTRY